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Background: Borrowing money is a common strategy to cope with health care costs. The impact of borrowing on
households can be severe, leading to indebtedness and further impoverishment. However, the available literature
on borrowing practices for health is limited. We explore borrowing practices for paying for health care by the poor
in Cambodia and provide a typology, associated conditions, and the extent of the phenomenon.
Methods: In addition to a semi-structured literature review, in-depth interviews were conducted with
representatives of 47 households with health-related debt and 19 managers of formal or informal credit schemes.
Results: A large proportion of Cambodians, especially the poor, resort to borrowing to meet the cost of health
care. Because of limited cash flow and access to formal creditors, the majority take out loans with high interest
rates from informal money lenders. The most common type of informal credit is locally known as Changkar and
consists of five kinds of loans: short-term loans, medium-term loans, seasonal loans, loans for an unspecified period,
and loans with repayment in labour, each with different lending and repayment conditions and interest rates.
Conclusion: This study suggests the importance of informal credit for coping with the cost of treatment and its
potentially negative impact on the livelihood of Cambodian people. We provide directions for further studies on
financial protection interventions to mitigate harmful borrowing practices to pay for health care in Cambodia.
Keywords: Borrowing practices, Indebtedness, Typology, Informal credits, CambodiaBackground
Introduction
Borrowing is a common strategy to cope with the costs
of illness. Kruk and colleagues [1] analysed the results of
the World Health Survey for forty low- and middle-
income countries that together represent more than half
the global population and found that 22% of households
had borrowed money to cope with the cost of illness.
Such coping mechanisms are most likely to occur in
countries where social health protection schemes are
underdeveloped or do not encompass informal sector
workers [2]. Russell and Gilson [3] reported from Sri Lanka
that health expenditure equalling 2.5% to 5% of monthly* Correspondence: ipor@niph.org.kh
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reproduction in any medium, provided the orincome triggered borrowing. Coping with health care
payments through borrowing and selling assets is
found to be common in many African countries, ran-
ging from 23% of households in Zambia to 68% in
Burkina Faso [4].
The 2010 Cambodian Demographic and Health Survey
found that 18% of people who sought care for an illness
resorted to borrowing. For serious illnesses, the propor-
tion of borrowing was as high as 36% [5]. Murshid [6]
studied 244 households located in three villages of di-
verse agro-ecological areas in Cambodia and found that
20% of the poorest socioeconomic quintile borrowed
money to pay for health related costs versus 9% of the
best-off with average annual interest rates of 170% and
53% respectively. In a recent survey among 5,395 house-
holds, 58% were found to be in debt. Of the indebted,
30% had more than one loan. Worryingly, 33% of loans
were taken out for paying medical bills [7]. Furtherhis is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
iginal work is properly cited.
Ir et al. BMC Health Services Research 2012, 12:383 Page 2 of 10
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/12/383analysis of the same data set indicated that of the poor-
est tercile households that experienced a health shock,
26% resorted to borrowing money with interest to pay
for the treatment, compared with 9% of the best-off ter-
cile households [8].
Health equity funds (HEF) –third party mechanisms
reimbursing selected health care providers for curative
services rendered to eligible poor [9,10] –were devel-
oped in Cambodia to facilitate access to health care for
the poor. Although such funds reduced the incidence of
borrowing for health care in an urban slum in Phnom
Penh [11], many poor households eligible for such
scheme still had to borrow. To assess the effects of user
fee exemptions through HEF on health seeking behav-
iour, out-of-pocket expenditure and coping mechanisms,
hospitalised exempted and paying patients were matched
and interviewed in two separate studies at one rural hos-
pital. In the first study [12], of the 199 exempted
patients, 83% still borrowed money. They borrowed an
amount on average 3.4 times the sum of direct costs in-
curred during the illness episode. Respective figures for
paying patients were 48% and 0.74. In the second study
[13], 82% of exempted patients resorted to borrowing;
on average they borrowed 6.6 times the total amount of
direct costs. Conversely, only 35% of paying patients
borrowed and the amount borrowed was 56% of the
sum of direct costs associated with the concerned illness.
The excessive amounts borrowed (in relation to direct
costs) by exempted patients are thought to be due to op-
portunity costs incurred when hospitalised.
Loans taken out for medical care differ from invest-
ment loans as they often respond to economic stress
events that require lump sums which need to be paid
urgently, with relatively little time for informed
decision-making concerning available credit suppliers.
This is especially the case when access to formal credit
suppliers such as banks is limited because of many
constraints, including scarce collateral, market seg-
mentation and lack of effective communication [14].
In this context, households in need of urgent cash
often borrow from unregulated money lenders who
charge usurious interest rates [15]. While borrowing
can help households to faster access health care in
case of illness [16], taking out loans in such situation
often leads to the sale of productive assets and results
in impoverishment. For example, in East Asia, the in-
ability to repay loans can lead to debt bondage, liter-
ally enslaving people [17]. Van Damme et al. [18]
followed up people who had borrowed to pay costs
associated with treatment of dengue in Cambodia and
found that 62% of them were still paying off their
debt and its interests after one year. Other studies in
Cambodia showed that costs related to illness are a
major cause of sale of land to repay illness-relateddebts. Moreover, when failing to repay such debts,
confiscation of assets is often the result [15,19].
A better understanding of the process through which
Cambodian households obtain cash for paying for health
care and associated lending and repayment conditions
will help to define appropriate policies and interventions
to limit the negative impact of such practices. Surpris-
ingly little has been published in the health literature on
this issue so far. We contribute to filling this knowledge
gap by exploring practices of borrowing for paying for
health care by the Cambodian population, predomin-
antly the poor, in an attempt to provide examples of
available health-related informal credit and associated
conditions.
Socio-economic and health context in Cambodia
Cambodia is a low income country with a GDP of US
$795 in 2010 [20] and a population of 13.4 million
people (2008 census). Over 80% of the population are
rural-based and 30% live below the absolute poverty line
of US$0.59 per day [21]. The country is recovering from
three decades of civil strife, including Maoist-style social
experiments by the Khmer Rouge regime under which
up to a quarter of the population were killed or died of
starvation. As a result, the existence of a State with a
more or less functioning public administration is fairly
recent –not much more than 20 years –while there
remains a considerable shortage of people with the
required technical and professional skills [22]. Compre-
hensive public health reforms started in 1996 when the
ministry of health launched its Health Coverage Plan
and impressive gains in health outcomes have been
attained since [5]. Nevertheless, private-for-profit health
providers, many of them informal, dominate the health
care market and are the preferred option for the popula-
tion [23].
Credit suppliers in Cambodia
The formal credit suppliers in Cambodia include banks
and microfinance institutions (MFIs) that are recognised
by the National Bank of Cambodia. According to the
“Law on Banking and Financial Institutions” enacted in
November 1999, the government recognizes three cat-
egories of banking institutions: (1) commercial banks,
which require a minimum registered capital of US$13
million and can carry out all banking activities; (2) spe-
cialized banks, which require a minimum registered cap-
ital of US$2.5 million and can carry out a limited
number of banking activities, as specified in the terms of
their license; and (3) MFIs, which require a minimum
registered capital of approximately US$62,500. The latter
provide financial services to entrepreneurs and small
businesses that have limited access to banking services.
Organisations that provide credit to the rural population
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rural credit operators.
Banks are mainly located in towns, contrary to MFIs
and rural credit operators. By 2011 there were 20
licensed MFIs and over 20 rural credit operators in
Cambodia that had US$492 million in outstanding loans
for about one million clients [24]. For individual loans
collateral is required, but for group loans this is not the
case. However, because of social exclusion, the poor and
vulnerable are often unable to participate in group activ-
ities and tend to lack collateral; hence, they are not ne-
cessarily reached by these formal creditors [25].
Along with these formal credit suppliers, there are
widespread informal or non-institutional credit suppliers
such as individual money lenders, groups of mutually
organized individuals and partnership. Individual money
lenders include relatives, friends, neighbours, landlords,
market vendors, traders and ‘informal’ money lenders.
The latter are ‘professional’ individual money lenders,
but unregulated, non-subsidized and often charge usuri-
ous interest rates, though easily accessible with little or
no collateral requirements. In addition, there are semi-
formal credit suppliers, which are local development
organizations, including rice banks and pig banks, mak-
ing them unsuitable for emergency loans.
Methods
Data collection
Because of the paucity of published documents in the
health literature on borrowing practices for paying for
health care, literature from other sectors, including rural
development and poverty alleviation, was consulted in a
thorough but non-systematic manner. For this purpose
Google Scholar was consulted in addition to PubMed
using the words ‘credit’, ‘formal’, informal’, ‘rural’, ‘debt
payment’, ‘interest rates’, ‘loans’, ‘borrowing practices’ and
‘rural finance’, alone or in combination. A similar search
was done on the ELDIS website, while for Cambodia
documents on rural development by the Cambodia De-
velopment Resource Institute were consulted. From the
references further documents were traced if the title
appeared relevant.
To better understand existing sources of credit and their
associated practices as well as their impact on livelihoods
in Cambodia, in-depth interviews using a semi-structured
questionnaire were conducted with 47 representatives of
households who reported health-related debts. These inter-
views were done in the local vernacular and took place at
the residence of the respondents or at the hospital between
August and October 2006.
Households with health related debt were purpos-
ively selected among the residents in Thmar Pouk and
Sotnikum rural districts and urban slums in Siem Reap
town and Phnom Penh capital. In each study site, therewas a HEF scheme. The operators of HEF had good
knowledge about poor households in their catchment
area and about those who experienced health-related
debt. Through these operators initial interviewees were
identified. The latter were then asked to identify other in-
debted households with similar socio-economic status.
Questions concerned household characteristics, degree
of indebtedness and associated amounts, the respective
health problem for which loans were sought, care seeking
behaviour, borrowing practices, source(s) of credit and
related conditions, and coping mechanisms.
Semi-structured interviews were also conducted with
twelve managers of HEF schemes, microfinance institu-
tions or banks, together with seven informal money len-
ders. The latter were mainly identified through the
interviewed representatives of indebted households. All
interviewees were based in the study sites. The inter-
views were done by three experienced researchers.
Analytical framework and data analysis
Development economics is sometimes described as eco-
nomics applied to settings characterised by failure in dif-
ferent markets, including insurance and credit markets.
For countries in economic transition like Cambodia,
where markets are insufficiently regulated, market liber-
alisation can create economic risks for households, espe-
cially in the health sector [26,27]. As pointed out by
Meessen et al. [26], economic transition can lead to eco-
nomic growth, but also reshape the pattern of entitle-
ments (e.g. from universal access to free health care to
access according to ability to pay), and change demand
for and supply of health care. The epidemiological and
demographic transitions together with asymmetry of in-
formation and limited regulatory constraints often lead
to increased demand for and supply of unnecessary and
expensive care. When coupled with insufficiently devel-
oped social health protection schemes, severe economic
consequences for households can arise when obtaining
health care. This occurs through a complex and inter-
active process which can be simplified as in Figure 1.
Source: adapted from McIntyre et al. [2].
As presented earlier in this paper, borrowing money is
a common strategy to meet the cost of health care in
many low- and middle-income countries. Because formal
creditors are unlikely to be used for emergency loans to
meet the costs of illness, we focus on informal creditors.
Phlong [25] differentiates four types of informal credit in
Cambodia: (1) Khchey –loans between friends and
neighbours without interest rates; (2) Tontine – an infor-
mal rotating group saving and lending system with 5 to
50 participants; (3) Bancham –pawning which implies
depositing a valuable item as collateral with the money-
lender; and (4) Changkar –money lending with interest
by mainly informal money lenders and better-off
Figure 1 Simplified flow chart of key issues relating to the economic consequences of illness.
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is of special interest and will be described in more detail,
especially the types of loans that they extend and related
payment conditions.
We assessed key characteristics of each type of Changkar
(including lending source, amount of loan, lending period,
lending conditions, interest rate, purposes of loan, and
mode of repayment), their advantages and disadvantages,
and their frequency of use for health care. Based on this in-
formation, mainly on the interest rate and repayment con-
ditions, the level of associated economic risk or harm for
the borrowers was estimated.
Interviews were tape recorded and transcribed. Result-
ing data were manually coded and grouped by themes
according to the abovementioned key characteristics of
Changkar for analysis. Information from interviews with
representatives of indebted households was carefully
interpreted and triangulated with responses of managers
and informal money lenders.
To allow comparison between types of Changkar,
monthly interest rates were estimated by dividing the
total amount of interest by the amount borrowed and
number of months for repaying, as reported by inter-
viewed borrowers. This was triangulated with interest
rates reported by interviewed lenders. All figures pro-
vided by the interviewees in Cambodian Riel or Thai
Baht were converted to US$.
Ethical consideration
This study is part of the “AIDS and Indebtedness” study,
which received ethical approval from the National Ethic
Committee for Health Research in Cambodia in February
2006 with reference number 016 NECHR and Ethical
Committee of Antwerp University.
Results
Key characteristics of indebted households and their
indebtedness
A total of 47 representatives of households indebted due
to health care costs were interviewed. They werequestioned about household characteristics, degree of in-
debtedness and associated amounts, the concerned
health problem for which loans were sought, care seek-
ing behaviour, borrowing practices, source(s) of credit
and related conditions, and coping mechanisms.
Table 1 summarises key characteristics of the 47 indebted
households and their indebtedness according to place of
residence. About half of them were from rural areas, the
rest were urban residents. The main sources of income
were daily labour and small business for the urban group
compared to farming and foraging for the rural group.
Based on socio-economic assessment criteria of HEF, they
were all poor households at the time of interview.
The average amount of pending debt was largest in
the urban group. The main sources of reported loans in
both groups were money lenders (53%) and relatives/
friends/neighbours (28%). Urban interviewees reported
the highest monthly interest rate.
Common types of informal credit and associated conditions
As mentioned by Phlong [25], loans with interest from
informal money lenders or Changkar are mostly used for
urgent and unanticipated financial requirements as they
are relatively flexible and easily accessible with no or
limited paper work. Often no collateral is requested ex-
cept for big loans or for persons without permanent resi-
dence. A clear deadline for repayment is set though not
strictly respected, as failure to respect the deadline does
not necessarily result in severe sanctions but translates
into harassment by the lender against the borrower to
identify means to repay the debt, including sale of assets.
The Changkar include five different kinds of loans,
each with proper requirements and implications
(Table 2), as elaborated with examples below.
Short-term loans cover a very short time period, typ-
ically between 10 and 20 days, though exceptionally 60
days or more. The amount is relatively small, often less
than USD100. The payment is done through daily instal-
ments of a fixed amount till the total amount is paid off
Table 1 Key characteristics of the indebted households and their indebtedness
Key variables Urban n = 24 Rural n = 23 All n = 47
Male-headed households (%) 16 (67) 16 (70) 32 (68)
Mean number of household members (SD) 4.5 (1.8) 6.1 (2.2) 5.3 (2.2)
Mean number of dependents (SD) 2.8 (1.5) 4.2 (2.1) 3.5 (1.9)
Households by main source of income (%)
Farming 0 20 (87) 20 (43)
Casual labourer 11 (46) 1 (4) 12 (26)
Small business 9 (38) 0 9 (19)
Other sources 4 (17) 0 4 (8)
No income 0 2 (9) 2 (4)
Households by socio-economic status (%)
Very poor 10 (42) 7 (30) 17 (36)
Poor 13 (54) 15 (65) 28 (60)
Near-poor 1 (4) 1 (4) 2 (4)
Median (mean) of total debt in US$ 138 (516) 70 (211) 125 (367)
Median (mean) number of outstanding loans 2 (2.7) 1 (1.8) 2 (2.3)
Median (mean) rate of monthly interests in % 10 (11) 7.0 (23.4) 10 (17)
Main sources of debt (%)
Money lenders 15 (63) 10 (44) 25 (53)
Relatives/friends/neighbours 4 (17) 9 (39) 13 (28)
Microfinance organisations 3 (13) 1 (4) 4 (9)
Banks 1 (4) 2 (9) 3 (6)
Others 1 (4) 1 (4) 2 (4)
SD = standard deviation.
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plicitly seen by some borrowers as interest). The interest
often amounts to 20% of the loan. These loans are called
‘Luy Roab’ (counting money) in the vernacular and are
common in areas with business activity such as markets.
Because of its accessibility, this type of borrowing is com-
monly used by the poor to meet their health care costs.
An HIV-infected widow with a 4-year old child residing
in a village in Siem Reap. She has no property and lives
with her brother. Her husband died of AIDS 10 months
before the interview. When he was still alive, he was
shopping around to treat his disease, mainly consulting
private health practitioners and traditional healers. He
spent about US$5,000 for various treatments whereby
they borrowed many times from different lenders. The last
loan was US$200 obtained from a money lender in their
village. The amount to pay back was US$240 with a
daily repayment of US$20 during 12 days, including the
20% interest rate. Unfortunately, her husband died after
which she sold her plot of land and finally her house to
reimburse the debts. She still had a debt of US$500 when
interviewed, 10 months past the deadline. The lenders
came to ask her every day. She sells wine, which allowsher to earn a maximum of US$0.5 a day. She receives
free antiretroviral treatment from an NGO, enabling her
to restore her health but is of the opinion that she will
never be able to pay back her outstanding debts.
Medium-term loans are called ‘Luy Ruos’ (living
money). The period of lending ranges from several
months to one year. The amount of this type of loans
can be significantly bigger than the short-term loans, up
to USD500 or more. Interest is to be paid monthly and
the loan capital should be repaid as a lump sum by the
agreed deadline. The monthly interest rate is usually be-
tween 5% and 10%. Because the amount of the loan is
considerable, collateral is often required and an official
transaction document such as a signed paper is made.
However, with trustful relationships built from previous
loans with the lender, some households can borrow
without collateral, but often have to pay double amounts
of interest instead. This kind of loan is not common for
covering costs of illness because the procedures to ob-
tain it are unfit for meeting urgent financial needs.
A young couple living with 3 relatives in a slum in
Phnom Penh. The wife used to work in a garment factory
Table 2 Overview of informal credit types and associated conditions




Short-term loan (Luy Roab) +++++ ++++
• Short lending period: 10–20 days • Quick, easy access; addressing urgent requirements
• Relatively small amounts • High interest rates coupled to daily repayment
• Daily repayment
• High interest (20%), to be paid as
extra days of repayment
• Common in areas with commercial
activities
• Usually no requirement for collateral
or paper work
Medium-term loan (Luy Ruos) +++ +++
• Lending period few months to a year • Large amount for relatively long period
• Relatively big amount • High interest rates and requirement for collateral, making it
less accessible for poor people
• Interest rates of 5-10% per month
• Deadline for repayment
• Collateral required as well as official
transaction
Seasonal loan ++ ++
• In-between season lending: 6–10
months
• Easy access for farmers
• Relatively big amounts • Repayment follows the farming cycle which is convenient
for rural people
• Interest rates of 50-100% for the
season
• Repayment in kind, just following harvest when prices are
low
• Repayment after harvest, in crops
• Very commonSimple or no conditions
Loans for unspecified period (Luy
Ngoab or Luy Chho)
++++ ++
• Unspecified period • Easy access for the poor
• Variable amount • Absence of repayment deadline is favourable for poor
people
• Relatively high interest: 1%/day; 5-
30%/month
• High interest rates,
• requirement for collateral for big amounts
• Flexible timing for repayment
• Collateral for large amounts
Loans with repayment in labour (Yok
Dai)
+ +
• Variable, though mostly short, lending
period
• Easy access, especially for the poorest
• Relatively small amount • No money required, independent of cash flow
• Interest of 100% for whole period • Undervalued labour
• Repayment in labour valued at 50% • Hampers foraging on which poor depend for survival
• Only available in rural areas • High interest rates
• No lending conditions
* rated from the less frequent ‘+’ to the most frequent ‘+++++’; ** rated from the lowest ‘+’ to the highest ‘++++’.
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heart condition she stopped working. Her husband and
brothers are daily labourers and can jointly earn about
$5 per day. Her husband borrowed US$600 from a
private money lender in the village to buy a motorbike
and to pay for health related expenses of his wife (about
40% of the loan). It was a loan for 4 months at a
monthly interest rate of 6%. Unfortunately, his motorbike
was stolen; he put a pair of golden ear rings as collateral,
estimated at US$40. The creditor confiscated them
because he was unable to pay the monthly interest for
almost two months at the time of interview.
Seasonal loans (no particular local name) are com-
mon among farmers who face cash constraints during
certain periods, especially before planting season. The
lending period ranges from six to ten months, typically
till the next harvest. The interest rate for the whole
lending period varies from 50% to 100%. The interest
and the loan capital are repaid at harvest time in the
form of rice, but calculated in monetary value. This
mode of repayment is unfavourable to the borrower as it
occurs just after the harvest, when the commodity price
is low. Additionally, the borrower often does not realise
the loan comes with such a high interest rate. Although
this loan is commonly used for agricultural investment,
few use it to pay for health care-related costs.
A rural family of 9 people (parents with 7 children)
with an income based on farming and foraging. The
mother was admitted to the provincial hospital in
Siem Reap for post-operative complications three
months prior to interview. Her situation had not
improved since. About US$500 was spent on hospital
fees, transport, food and other immediate needs during
the hospitalization. The money was borrowed despite
benefiting from free hospitalisation through the health
equity fund. To meet the above mentioned expenses
they borrowed US$250 from a relative and another US
$250 from a money lender, without putting collateral.
Both loans are to be paid back at the following
harvest. The relative did not charge interest while the
money lender demands 50% for the whole period
(Repayment of US$375 for the loan of US$250).
Loans for an unspecified period, called Luy Ngoab or
Luy Chho (death money or stand-by money), are pro-
vided until the borrower can repay. Interest has to be
paid regularly on a daily, weekly or monthly basis and
the interest rates depend on the lender and amount of
loan with bigger loans tending to have lower interest
rates. The daily interest rate is often 1%, while monthly
interest rates vary from 5% to 30%. The amount of loan
also varies from around USD25 for a loan with daily
interest payment to USD400 for loans with weekly andmonthly interest payments. This type of loan is commonly
used by poor households to pay for health care, but often
the sum of interest exceeds the amount borrowed.
A rural middle class family of 6 people with three
children employed and one at school. The children earn
US$1-1.5 per day while the father gets US$1.25 -1.75 per
day. The family had a plot of land valued at US$5,000,
five hectares of rice land and 4 adult cows. The wife was
diagnosed with diabetes one year before the interview.
Initially she was hospitalised at the district hospital after
which she sought care from private providers in town.
They sold 4 cows for US$500 and twice rice land for a
total of US$475 and borrowed US$250 from a money
lender to pay for her health care and other related costs.
The loan was without collateral or deadline but came
with a monthly interest rate of 5%. They intend to sell
their remaining land if they are unable to meet the
monthly debt repayment of US$12.5. She pays monthly
US$16.5 for drugs and laboratory tests at a private
provider.
Loans with repayment in labour are provided in cash
but reimbursed in labour and termed ‘Yok Dai’ (taking
hand). Respective borrowers are often very poor with
limited ability to find enough cash to pay back. The loan
is thus calculated in terms of the amount of daily work
required, mostly farming work such as cutting or plant-
ing rice. The interest is hidden in the reduced value of
labour which is repaid at below market prices. This type
of loan is not everywhere practiced and related amounts
tend to be small, often not more than a few dollars.
Consequently, it is not so helpful for the poor to meet
their health care costs, as these are often far higher.
A very poor family consisting of a 15-year old orphan
and his 68-year grandmother. The family has no
regular income and relies on donations by relatives
and neighbours. For treatment of the grandmother’s
chronic illness they borrowed US$20 from a well-off
farmer in the village. Since they had no income, the
child had to work to repay the farmer. The daily
payment for his labour was US$0.50 versus the
prevailing market price of US$1 or more. Theoretically
they could repay the US$20 within 40 days but, two
years later, they had not been able to do since new
loans were taken.
Causes of health-related debt and coping mechanisms
The reported health problems leading to borrowing
among the 47 households were a mixture of major infec-
tious diseases (such as AIDS, dengue, typhoid fever, se-
vere malaria, meningitis, severe injuries and acute
abdominal syndromes) that require hospitalization, in-
cluding major surgery, and chronic non-communicable
diseases (such as diabetes, hypertension, heart diseases,
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Two respondents in Phnom Penh reported normal deliv-
ery as a cause of their indebtedness.
Care for infectious diseases and other acute problems
was mainly sought from public hospitals. For chronic
diseases, on the contrary, both public health facilities
and private providers were consulted. Major expenses
for chronic diseases were reported to stem from consult-
ing private providers. The cost correlated with the num-
ber of providers consulted which resulted from shopping
around for successful treatment. It is interesting to note
that many of the indebted households were poor and eli-
gible for HEF assistance; some did benefit from such
assistance.
In response to the question of how would they pay off
the debt, the large majority of the respondents said that
they had no way to do so. For those who thought they
were able to repay, most would resort to selling their last
piece of land, working more or borrowing from relatives
and friends.
Discussion
The literature indicates that a large proportion of
Cambodians borrow to meet the costs of health care.
Access to formal credit suppliers, especially for the
poor, is limited. Hence, they rely on loans with high
interest rates from informal creditors. Consequently,
many become heavily indebted with considerable po-
tential for further impoverishment. A major reason for
these borrowing practices is the limited cash flow in
the Cambodian society. Prasso [28] pointed out that in
2000 the amount of money in circulation in the country
stood at US$28 per person only. Historical reference is
also made to the fact that French colonisers tried to
tackle perverse borrowing practices by money lenders
to peasants at annual interest rates of 200–300%.
Current interest rates are lower though still enormous.
In neighbouring Vietnam by contrast, monthly interest
rates by private money lenders were found to be only
1.8% on average [29].
Many authors such as McIntyre et al. [2] and Storeng
et al. [30] report on perverse effects of borrowing from
money lenders to pay for health care related costs but
do not mention interest rates associated with such loans.
Since interest rates increase the amount of debt to be re-
paid, effects of such loans will last longer than for
interest-free credit. Loans from money lenders are taken
out because of the limited time frame during which
health providers have to be paid. Borrowing from money
lenders is also mostly practiced by people with limited
social resources such as reciprocity between households
or support from community organizations [2,31]. Social
resources were reported to be one of the most important
sources for quickly mobilising money although the poortend to be the least likely to have access to them [32]. In
Cambodia, the poorest have the least assets that can be
quickly liquidated in tandem with limited social resources.
As a result they will have to resort to money lenders and
pay the highest interest rates because of lack of collateral.
As pointed out by Storeng and colleagues [30], a vi-
cious cycle is created whereby loans are obtained to pay
off interest of previous loans and assets are sold to pay
off debt, which in turn further reduces productivity and
thus income and ability to pay. But few studies have
been done to assess the long term effects of loans for
paying for health care on household livelihood [32]. The
negative consequences of financial stress on mental
health in low-income countries are increasingly being
documented [33,34]. In India, for example, indebtedness
is a major cause of suicide amongst farmers [35]. It is
thus not unreasonable to advocate for longitudinal stud-
ies on coping strategies resulting from borrowing, espe-
cially with interest, to assess the long-term effects on
household economies but also on health itself. Such
studies could be done per type of informal credit and
participants should be carefully selected since many re-
sort to more than one credit source.
Strategies should be developed to limit borrowing with
interest to pay for health care. One option could be to
attract the population, especially the poor, to public
health providers where costs are considerably lower than
in the private sector [5]. A common strategy to attract
patients to public health providers is to extend exemp-
tions from user fees for certain population groups such
as women and children, or for prevalent diseases of
which control is a public good, such as tuberculosis [36].
Several authors have pointed out that free health care
alone is not sufficient and that it also requires exemp-
tion initiatives to subsidise transport costs [37,38]. In
Cambodia, HEF have been developed to attract the poor
to exempted health services. They are extended nation-
wide as they greatly improve financial access [39]. How-
ever, the vast majority of beneficiaries of such schemes
still first seek health care in the private sector where
they incur most expenses for treating the condition
[12,13]. Accordingly, at least in Cambodia, HEF un-
accompanied by additional interventions are not the
panacea to overcoming excessive borrowing costs from
money lenders due to treatment seeking. Although HEF
were not found to reduce the likelihood of incurring
health-related debt, coverage by a HEF did reduce the
amount of health-related debt by 25-28% [40]. More in-
formation is thus required on the determinants of care
seeking to be able to attract people to the public sector
when sick.
A more comprehensive approach than fee waivers or
user fee exemptions is required, including interventions
outside the health sector [31,41]. As such there was a
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cing strategies and mechanisms to enable improved cop-
ing with the costs of illness through reinforcement of
existing social networks [2]. However, as seen above, the
poor are least likely to access such networks. Never-
theless, with the emergence of chronic diseases and
associated requirements for lifelong treatments in a fi-
nancially constrained environment like Cambodia [42],
the need for such community financing becomes more
prominent [43]. Studies are therefore required to elicit
existing barriers to social inclusion and means to over-
come them.
Microfinance institutions have been advanced as a po-
tential solution and they often go hand in hand with
health interventions [44] to mitigate health problems
and the need to spend money on related treatments.
However, it has been reported from Bangladesh that the
poorest women refused to participate in programs based
on microcredit because of their aversion for the stress
associated with loan repayments [45,46]. Others consider
microfinance an effective risk mitigation strategy that
enables borrowers to cope with sudden costs such as
those associated with health care seeking [47]. The fig-
ures cited above indicate that the MFIs insufficiently
penetrate rural Cambodia. Therefore, further research is
needed to investigate whether extending microcredit to
the poor can be used as a means to avert borrowing
from informal creditors for health care expenses, and
how this might be done.
If MFIs would be pursued as an option outside the
health sector, additional interventions for the poorest
should be implemented, similar to the experience in
Bangladesh, including: provision of income generating
asset grants, subsistence allowance until asset grants
generate income, skills development training, social
awareness development [41,45]. Alternatively, a poten-
tially more powerful intervention for the poorest may be
the provision of non-conditional cash transfers [30,34].
Meaningful research in Cambodia would then relate to
identifying the most comprehensive approach to avoid
or reduce the extent of borrowing from money lenders
for health related expenses by the poor. This could con-
sist of a combination of HEF and non-health sector
interventions.
However, it is imperative that countries like Cambodia
progress towards the development of regulatory inter-
ventions for the credit market. A package of basic
consumer protection rights tailored to the problems
faced by the poor in accessing money should be imple-
mented [48].
Conclusion
In Cambodia, similar to the situation in many other low-
income countries where social health protection isunderdeveloped, a large proportion of households have
to borrow to meet the cost of health care. We paid spe-
cial attention to the informal credit sources to which
most cash-strapped patients or caretakers direct them-
selves to pay for treatment. Such credit practices create
a vicious borrowing cycle for many households and in-
duce further impoverishment. The findings suggest the
importance of credit market failure and the insufficient
social health protection system in Cambodia. Irrespec-
tively of the type of Changkar used for obtaining money
to pay for health care costs, economic (or livelihood)
consequences appear considerable.
In order to successfully reduce borrowing practices
from informal sources that charge exorbitant interest
rates, a range of studies are suggested which would allow
formulating the best strategy for this purpose. These
assessments relate to longitudinal studies per type of
Changkar and their effects on livelihoods and health of
the borrowers and household members; eliciting care
seeking determinants and gearing public sector practices
towards the expectations of rural people in order to at-
tract the poor to the public health providers, including
identification of additional interventions to HEF to make
them more effective. More information on strategies to
overcome social exclusion, effective mechanisms for ex-
tension of MFIs to the poor and non-health interven-
tions that can avert harmful borrowing practices is also
required.
Competing interests
We declare that we have no competing interests.
Authors’ contributions
PI developed the study, collected and analysed the data, and wrote the
research report on which this paper is based. In addition, he contributed to
writing the final draft as well as revising and finalizing the accepted
manuscript. BJ did the literature review and wrote the manuscript for
submission and contributed to writing the revised and final version of this
paper. BM and WVD provided content expertise throughout the design and
implementation of the study, and contributed to the final version of the
manuscript for submission. All authors read and approved the final
manuscript.
Acknowledgements
We would like to thank Kristof Decoster for critically reviewing the
manuscript and for assistance with editing.
Author details
1National Institute of Public Health, Ministry of Health, PO BOX 1300, Phnom
Penh, Cambodia. 2Department of Public Health, Institute of Tropical
Medicine, Antwerp, Nationalestraat, Antwerp 155, B-2000, Belgium. 3Health
Sector Support Programme, Luxembourg Development, Ministry of Health,
PO BOX 7084, Vientiane, Lao PDR.
Received: 17 March 2012 Accepted: 30 October 2012
Published: 7 November 2012
References
1. Kruk ME, Goldmann E, Galea S: Borrowing and selling to pay for health
care in low- and middle-income countries. Health Aff (Millwood ) 2009,
28:1056–1066.
Ir et al. BMC Health Services Research 2012, 12:383 Page 10 of 10
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/12/3832. McIntyre D, Thiede M, Dahlgren G, Whitehead M: What are the economic
consequences for households of illness and of paying for health care in
low- and middle-income country contexts? Soc Sci Med 2006, 62:858–865.
3. Russell S, Gilson L: Are health services protecting the livelihoods of the
urban poor in Sri Lanka? Findings from two low-income areas of
Colombo. Soc Sci Med 2006, 63:1732–1744.
4. Leive A, Xu K: Coping with out-of-pocket health payments: empirical
evidence from 15 African countries. Bull World Health Organ 2008,
86:849–856.
5. Cambodia Demographic and Health Survey 2010. Phnom Penh, Cambodia:
National Institute of Statistics, Ministry of Planning; Directorate General for
Health, Ministry of Health; and ICF Macro; 2011.
6. Murshid KAS: Food Security in an Asian Transitional Economy: The Cambodian
Experience. Phnom Penh: Cambodia Development Resource Institute and
United Nations Research Institute for Social Development; 1998.
7. Domrei Research and Consulting: Household debt in rural Cambodia. Phnom
Penh: Domrei Research and Consulting; 2011.
8. Domrei Research and Consulting: Health shocks and treatments in rural
Cambodia. Phnom Penh: Domrei Research and Consulting; 2011.
9. Ir P, Bigdeli M, Meessen B, Van Damme W: Translating knowledge into
policy and action to promote health equity: The Health Equity Fund
policy process in Cambodia 2000–2008. Health Policy 2010:200–209.
10. Noirhomme M, Meessen B, Griffiths F, Ir P, Jacobs B, Thor R, et al: Improving
access to hospital care for the poor: comparative analysis of four health
equity funds in Cambodia. Health Policy Plan 2007, 22:246–262.
11. Van Pelt M, Morineau G: When slum dwellers seek health care: Exploring
a community-based Health Equity Fund’s impact on indebtedness for
health care and on utilisation of health services. In Health and social
protection: experiences from Cambodia, China and Lao PDR. Edited by
Meessen B, Pei X, Criel B, Bloom G. Antwerp, Belgium: Institute of Tropical
Medicine; 2008:491–518.
12. Jacobs B, Price NL, Oeun S: Do exemptions from user fees mean free
access to health services? A case study from a rural Cambodian hospital.
Trop Med Int Health 2007, 12:1391–1401.
13. Jacobs B, Price N: A comparative study of the effectiveness of pre-
identification and passive identification for hospital fee waivers at a rural
Cambodian hospital. In Health and social protection: experiences from
Cambodia, China and Lao PDR. Edited by Meessen B, Pei X, Criel B, Bloom G.
Antwerp, Belgium: Institute of Tropical Medicine; 2008:437–467.
14. Besley T: How do market failures justify interventions in rural credit
markets? The World Bank Research Observer 1994, 9:27–47.
15. Kenjiro Y: Why Illness Causes More Serious Economic Damage than Crop
Failure in Rural Cambodia. Dev Chang 2005, 36:759–783.
16. Gertler P, Levine DI, Moretti E: Do microfinance programs help families
insure consumption against illness? Health Econ 2009, 18:257–273.
17. Daru P, Churchill C, Beemsterboer E: The prevention of debt bondage
with microfinance-led services. Eur J Development Research 2005,
17:132–154.
18. Van Damme W, Van Leemput L, Por I, Hardeman W, Meessen B: Out-of-
pocket health expenditure and debt in poor households: evidence from
Cambodia. Trop Med Int Health 2004, 9:273–280.
19. Oxfam: Phnom Penh. Phnom Penh, Cambodia: Oxfam; 2000.
20. World Bank: GDP per capita (in current USD). http://data.worldbank.org/
indicator/ NY.GDP PCAP.CD, accessed 22.01.2012.
21. World Bank: Poverty profile and trends in Cambodia in 2007. Findings from the
Cambodia Socio-Economic Survey (CSES). Bangkok: World Bank, East Asia and
the Pacific; 2009.
22. Ballard BM, Sloth C, Wharton D: We are living with worry all the time. A
participatory poverty assessment of the Tonle Sap. Phnom Penh: Cambodia
Development Resource Institute; 2007.
23. Meessen B, Bigdeli M, Chheng K, Decoster K, Ir P, Men C, et al: Composition
of pluralistic health systems: how much can we learn from household
surveys? An exploration in Cambodia. Health Policy Plan 2011,
26(Suppl 1):i30–i44.
24. Kem S: Policy Options for Vulnerable Groups: Income Growth and Social
Protection. Phnom Penh: Cambodia Development Resource Institute,
Council for Agricultural and Rural Development and International Food
Policy Research Institute; 2011.
25. Phlong P: Informal credit systems in Cambodia. Illinois: Department of
Anthropology, Northern Illinois University; 2009.26. Meessen B, Zhenzhong Z, Van Damme W, Devadasan N, Criel B, Bloom G:
Iatrogenic poverty. Trop Med Int Health 2003, 8:581–584.
27. Watts JJ, Segal L: Market failure, policy failure and other distortions in
chronic disease markets. BMC Health Serv Res 2009, 9:102.
28. Prasso DST: The Riel value of money: how the world’s only attempt to abolish
money has hindered Cambodia’s economic development. Asia Pacific Issues 49.
Honolulu: East–west Center; 2011.
29. Barslund M, Tarp F: Formal and informal credit in four provinces of
Vietnam. J Development Studies 2008, 44:485–503.
30. Storeng KT, Baggaley RF, Ganaba R, Ouattara F, Akoum MS, Filippi V: Paying
the price: the cost and consequences of emergency obstetric care in
Burkina Faso. Soc Sci Med 2008, 66:545–557.
31. Molyneux C, Hutchison B, Chuma J, Gilson L: The role of community-based
organizations in household ability to pay for health care in Kilifi District,
Kenya. Health Policy Plan 2007, 22:381–392.
32. Russell S: The economic burden of illness for households in developing
countries: a review of studies focusing on malaria, tuberculosis, and
human immunodeficiency virus/acquired immunodeficiency syndrome.
Am J Trop Med Hyg 2004, 71:147–155.
33. Lund C, Breen A, Flisher AJ, Kakuma R, Corrigall J, Joska JA, et al: Poverty
and common mental disorders in low and middle income countries: A
systematic review. Soc Sci Med 2010, 71:517–528.
34. Lund C, De SM, Plagerson S, Cooper S, Chisholm D, Das J, et al: Poverty
and mental disorders: breaking the cycle in low-income and middle-
income countries. Lancet 2011, 378:1502–1514.
35. Behere PB, Behere AP: Farmers’ suicide in Vidarbha region of Maharashtra
state: A myth or reality? Indian J Psychiatry 2008, 50:124–127.
36. Witter S: Service- and population-based exemptions: are these the way
forward for equity and efficiency in health financing in low-income
countries? Adv Health Econ Health Serv Res 2009, 21:251–288.
37. Kruk ME, Mbaruku G, Rockers PC, Galea S: User fee exemptions are not
enough: out-of-pocket payments for ‘free’ delivery services in rural
Tanzania. Trop Med Int Health 2008, 13:1442–1451.
38. Witter S: Removal of user fees for health care - a review of recent experiences
in Africa. Khartoum: The World Bank; 2010.
39. Tangcharoensathien V, Patcharanarumol W, Ir P, Aljunid SM, Mukti AG,
Akkhavong K, et al: Health-financing reforms in southeast Asia: challenges
in achieving universal coverage. Lancet 2011, 377:863–873.
40. Flores G, Ir P, Men CR, O’Donnell O, van Doorslaer E: Financial protection of
patients through compensation of providers: the impact of health equity funds
in Cambodia. Amsterdam: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper; 2011.
41. Ahmed SM, Petzold M, Kabir ZN, Tomson G: Targeted intervention for the
ultra poor in rural Bangladesh: Does it make any difference in their
health-seeking behaviour? Soc Sci Med 2006, 63:2899–2911.
42. Ir P, Men C, Lucas H, Meessen B, Decoster K, Bloom G, et al: Self-reported
serious illnesses in rural Cambodia: a cross-sectional survey. PLoS One
2010, 5:e10930.
43. Beaglehole R, Epping-Jordan J, Patel V, Chopra M, Ebrahim S, Kidd M, et al:
Improving the prevention and management of chronic disease in low-
income and middle-income countries: a priority for primary health care.
Lancet 2008, 372:940–949.
44. Leatherman S, Metcalfe M, Geissler K, Dunford C: Integrating microfinance
and health strategies: examining the evidence to inform policy and
practice. Health Policy Plan 2012, 27(2):85–101.
45. Halder SR, Mosley P: Working with the ultra-poor: learning from BRAC
experience. J Int Dev 2004, 16:387–406.
46. McIntyre L, Rondeau K, Kirkpatrick S, Hatfield J, Islam KS, Huda SN: Food
provisioning experiences of ultra poor female heads of household living
in Bangladesh. Soc Sci Med 2011, 72:969–976.
47. Mohindra K, Haddad S, Narayana D: Can microcredit help improve the
health of poor women? Some findings from a cross-sectional study in
Kerala, India. Int J Equity Health 2008, 7:2.
48. Brix L, McKee L: Consumer protection regulation in low-access environments:
opportunities to promote responsible finance. Washington: CGAP; 2010.
doi:10.1186/1472-6963-12-383
Cite this article as: Ir et al.: Toward a typology of health-related informal
credit: an exploration of borrowing practices for paying for health care
by the poor in Cambodia. BMC Health Services Research 2012 12:383.
